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This book has not been getting adequate pro-
fessional notice, especially in the journals. Many
social scientists have read it with varying degrees
of approval but as far as I know very few, if any,
treat it as relevant to their models. Yet it is no
longer professionally defensible to ignore the
CIA. What the book describes is outside inter-
vention sufficiently powerful to influence the
balance of political forces in several Latin
I This was written before the recent deportation crder against
the author. I benefited from the comments of several
colleagues at IDS.
American countries, thus shaping their foreign
policies, the patterns of their economic growth
and their social structures.2
It falls into three sections. The first (1956-60) is
an account of the recruitment and training of a
CIA agent, which brings out the attractions of
this career, especially for someone liable to be
conscripted for Vietnam, and its underlying
political philosophy. The reader is struck by how
much the original and legal purpose, information
gathering and analysis, has been supplemented
by a new and illegal one, covert intervention in
the politics of foreign countries, using advanced
technology.
The second, taking up the bulk of the book, is
about the operations of CIA 'stations' in the years
1960-68 in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico. This
is an important primary source on both US policy
in Latin America and the internal politics of these
three countries.
The last section includes the author's own
appraisal of the agency and describes his efforts
from 1968-74, mostly in Paris and London, to
write this exposure, "helped" by various
"friends", some of whom turned out to be CIA
agents trying to stop the book being published
and to silence the author. ÇI'his section would
make an exciting film.)
The emphasis on the work the author had to do
before writing the book raises some questions
about its value as a primary source. The diary
format is, as the introduction acknowledges,
simply an ex post artifice: "intensive research"
was needed to "reinforce my own recollections."
This device (seemingly unnecessary) might be
taken to justify the lack of professional notice.
But although no doubt there are minor errors,
and perhaps the author's perceptions were less
naive at the time than he now remembers, there
is not much reason to question the general
picture that emerges. The known framework of
US Latin American policy in the l960s is as
depicted here. Subsequent Congressional hearings
have provided evidence quite consistent with what
2 An earlier exposure, The CIA and ehe Cuir of Intel-lsgence by victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (UK
editicn: Jonathan Cape, 1974) was marred by numerous
deletions to meet the requirements of US government
censorship. In any case, it does not contain nearly so
much field materialMarchetti worked for the CIA in
Washington and Marks was in the State Department.
However, its interesting data on general CIA policies and
practices are brcadly consistent with Agee's book.
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Agee describes.3 Naming dozens of CIA officials,
agents, cover organisations and operations add
conviction.
For the general reader this is a repugnant story.
Ministers are bribed, arrests arranged of radical
and reformist leaders, enemy agents provided
with girl-friends and blackmailed, rumours manu-
factured and spread, journalists and editors
bought, generals and admirals induced to commit
treason, terrorists subsidised, workers paid to
form breakaway unions, student associations
destroyed and new ones established, police forces
equipped with the latest electrical gadgetry.4
In the early years of his CIA career, Mr Agee
believed that these means were justified by the
ends, a combination of democracy and social
reform, as outlined in the documents of the
Alliance for Progress. Thwarting Communism,
especially Cuban and Soviet foreign policy, was
a pre-condition for achieving them. But he
noticed that it was this condition which was in
fact treated as the real objective. Much effort, for
example, was spent buying support throughout
the hemisphere for the CIA-organised Bay of
Pigs invasion in 1961, and financing parties and
politicians who favoured breaking off diplomatic
relations with Cuba. On the other hand, the
agency devoted no resources at all to arranging
for the exile or imprisonment of powerful land-
owners: it did not even bother to invent any
rumours or pay any journalists to discredit them.
Indeed, it was so keen to prevent hostile or even
non-aligned governments from taking power that
it backed those who were most corrupt and reac-
tionary. especially in the armed forces, and used
any means, however sordid, to support them. The
author was in the end sickened. It was a
traumatic experience to hear the groans of a man
being tortured by the Uruguayan secret police
and realise it was someone he had himself de-
nounced. Another was the massacre of students
in Mexico City (just before the 1968 Olympic
games) by a government whose President,
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, was a "close collaborator
of the Mexico City station."5
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3 CIA operations in Chile are described in detail in Hearings
before the Select Committee to study Government Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the USSenate, Vol. 7 Covert Action especially Appendix Covert
Action in Chile 1963-1973: Staff Report, US Government
Printing Office, 1976.
4 Of course, as became revealed in the closing months of the
Nixon regime, CIA techniques began to seep back into
the USA itself, as has happened elsewhere (cf. OAS
operations in France). Indeed the agency became an
accomplice in some of President Nixon's illegal activities,
b-eh directly and through former agents such as Howard
Hunt.
5 The author contrasts the agency's activities pointedly with
the public plea of its former director, Richard Helms:
"You've got to trust us. We are honourable men."
Social scientists are, one would like to think, not
immune from moral revulsion either, despite the
inroads of positivism, but we have another con-
cern as well: how the material in this book affects
our models, in the sense of broad theoretical
frameworks.
Scholars in many disciplines (and virtually all
international civil servants) treat governments, if
only implicitly, as sovereign and genuine spokes-
men for their nation's interest. Others, especially
but not only Marxists, also see them as repre-
sentative, although only of a dominant class or
at least social coalition. The assumption that they
speak for any national interest, however narrowly
defined, has already been partially undermined
by the growing work of 'dependence' theorists
on how economic, political and military pressures
constrain a government's room to manoeuvre,
and even more by recent work on cultural de-
pendence, the moulding of the minds of decision-
makers by imported theories and attitudes. The
sovereignty of a government becomes scarcely
credible at all when we learn that numerous
cabinet ministers and senior civil and military
officials are salaried employees of an agency
of another government (not all of them, of
course, conscious of the true source of funds).6
What exactly is 'the State' in such a case? An
electrode has been implanted in the cortex and
this as always throws doubt on the subject's
identity.
Another fundamental question is raised about the
very substance of international relations. Accord-
ing to material presented in this book, US foreign
policy in many key fields is decided and imple-
mented by the CIA, leaving ambassadors in the
countries concerned largely ritual functions. (One
ambassador preferred not to know about the
activities of the agency.)7 To study treaties,
speeches and other official documents may be
dangerously misleading, when the most important
elements in international behaviour are clan-
destine activities in this 'informal sector' of
diplomacy.
Questions are also raised about analyses on a
national plane. It is clear that a study of
Ecuadorian politics would hardly be scientifically
defensible unless it took acount of the CIA as a
causal factor, whatever the model used. This
applies to micro-level research too. If a political
6 A President must often look around the Cabinet room and
wonder which of his colleagues is also on the payroll. To
paraphrase Stanley Baldwin, who once claimed that he
had formed a Cabinet of which Harrow could be proud,
Ecuador at this time had a Cabinet which was a credit to
the CIA.
7 On the other hand, Ambassador Korry knew of and sup-
ported most of the covert CIA actions against Allende.
Select Committee Hearings op cit.
historian wanted to explain why (say) bombs
were placed in churches in Cuenca (9/i/62) or
Guayaquil (20/1/62), research should start by
an interview with the then chief of the CTA
station on his objectives, how he expected bomb-
ing to help achieve them, how he evaluated the
results, etc. Since even identifying him will not
normally be possible, much research inevitably
misses the main factorsand CIA officials must
often be amused at the naivety of social
scientists.
It appears from this book that the agency's in-
fluence is usually decisive. A clearly definable
pattern can be seen in its procedures for destroy-
ing governments it considers unhelpful to US
interests. The process by which Arosemena was
overthrown by the Ecuadorian military shows a
strong formal similarity with the pattern of later
coups d'etat which demolished the governments
of Jagan in Guyana, Goulart in Brazil and
(especially) Allende in Chile.8 Trade unions are
created or stimulated to organise strikes which
disrupt economic life;9 press articles and leaflets
are circulated to whip up hysteria and undermine
law and order; provocateurs are hired to set off
explosions and start riots; officers in the armed
forces are supplied with up-to-date hardware and
bribes; plans for a Communist revolution are
forged, planted and brought to light at a con-
venient moment.1° The very counter-moves
provoked (imports of arms from communist
countries, censorship, etc.) fit the propaganda line
and help stimulate and justify a military take-
over. A high priority in research should, in fact,
be to explore this pattern of CIA-engineered
changes of government: it would be of help to
governments to whom the same treatment might
be applied in the future'1including, possibly,
some in Europe.
8 An earlier example, perhaps the model, was the overthrow
of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala in the l950s,
except that this involved military invasion (with the com-
plicity of the government of Nicaragua).
9 One major contribution of the book is te show the strength
of CIA influence in unions, in co-operation with the
AFL/CIO, especially through its contrl of ORIT. the
Latin American regional organisation of the WCFTU.
This evidence tends to support world models, such as
those of Sunkel, which treat the industrial proletariat in
modern sectors as basically 'transnational' and therefore
non-revolutionary, in contrast to Marxist models. However,
one could argue that CIA intervention is so powerful that
the behaviour of organised labour (viz, the strike ofChilean copper workers against the Allende government)
is evidence more of the agency's influence than of new
class alliances.
10 Meanwhile USAID and the Export-Imprt Bank cut off finan-
cial support and US representatives endeavour to get inter-
national agencies, such as IBRD and the Inter-American
Development Bank, t do the same.il International agencies would be rendering a service by
providing technical assistance to improve security against
clandestine operations organised by foreign governments,
although of course the governments most in need of such
help may be too heavily infiltrated to request it. Agencies
are in any case hardly autonomous enough to provide such
assistance.
Once in power, the new military governments
have to rely heavily on imported capital,
especially private capital, although substantial
aid also suddenly becomes available. This is also
true of governments which have corne to power
with less evident CIA support, but which use its
help subsequently in ruthless suppression of
egalitarian political forcesas in most of Latin
America now. The reader of this book would
look askance at sociological projects designed to
explain the extent to which poverty is caused by
the attitudes and customs of the poor. The poor
are poor, he would conclude, because the CIA
believes that this suits US interests. The situation
in the region, especially the 'southern cone',
seems stabilised in the long-term interests of US
foreign policy (at least on the CIA's interpreta-
tion of this). Indeed there appears to be a sort of
transnationalisation of counter-insurgency. A
group of governments are determined to elimin-
ate, expel or demoralise a whole generation of
reformist and revolutionary intellectuals, with
their own security forces aided by CIA training,
equipment and facilities for exchanging informa-
tion. This is the counter-part to what is seen as
a transnational threat of communism.
In such circumstances the economists in planning
offices could only affect the pattern of growth
marginally, however sophisticated their tech-
niques, even if they were allowed a more than
ritualistic role.12 (Sophistication would merely
mask irrelevance.) Purely economic analysis is
in fact trivial: a function in which the only
exogenous variables are economic is technically
mis-specified. For this reason, lectures on (say)
economic development which left out the CIA
would be biased.
So would any text on official statistics which did
the same. It would be interesting to know where
CIA transactions (a) should (b) do appear in the
balance of payments or estimates of personal
income, and similarly for CIA agents in statistics
of employment. Presumably a statistician who
had the data would construct a separate table for
its activities in a system of national accounts. It
would make an interesting example for a UN
statistical manual (eg on the System of National
Accounts), of an 'informal' sector the dimen-
sions of which have to be guessed.'3 But for pur-
poses of aggregative measures of welfare what
is its 'output'and in principle should this be
considered a 'final' product?
12 Actually the Minister of Economics in Ecuador was aCIA agent, and the Minister of Planning an unpaid
collaborator.13 Are there, one wonders, any proxies one could useeg
'deaths due to unidentifiable causes', numbers of auto-
mobiles owned by cabinet ministers?
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Questions are also raised by statistics of law
enforcement. Some arrests, convictions, imprison-
ments, executions, are for universally recognised
crimes, such as robbery or murder for personal
gain. But in many countries (eg Chile), they cover
those who merely have the wrong political views.
Indeed, in the 'southern cone' of Latin America,
many of the murders are done by agents of the
state themselves (often in plain clothes), or by
vigilantesthe informal gendarmerieand re-
main unrecorded.
Another example: aid is usually treated as suffi-
ciently homogeneous to be summed. Yet what is
the meaning of statistics, such as those published
by OECD, adding Swedish (or British) assistance
for Kenyan rural development to US 'public
safety' aid to improve police interrogation tech-
niques in Latin Americaoften applied against
peasant leaders? What welfare implications do
we draw from the increase in such a total?'4
Identifying the 'recipient' also becomes difficult
if aid is requested by a minister who is in fact
an agent of the donor. The problems of the social
scientist are even greater. In the first place, much
of the data in current use, especially about Com-
munist countries, consist of 'disinformation'
circulated by the agency. Moreover, many major
research projects have been initiated, financed
and steered by the agency (often without the
knowledge of the researchers).
Yet we must not exaggerate the agency's influ-
ence. While it is indefensible for social scientists
to ignore the CIA, it would also be a mistake to
go to the other extreme. In the first place, the
material presented here covers only Latin
America. It is reasonable to presume that the
influence of the agency (or 'company') has been
much weaker in other continents, except South-
East Asia (and Iran and Zaire). Informal
diplomacy à la CIA is certainly practised by
agencies of other governments: their invisibility
reflects the fact that exposure is more difficult
than in the United States. No doubt French
intelligence services are highly active in West
Africa, and are not only 'gathering data'. But
in many countries several agencies must be
operating and this very diversity provides the
'host' with a degree of protection (just a diversity
in aid or trade reduces economic dependence):
casual observation suggests that cooperation even
among 'We tern' intelligence agencies is cautious.
Moreover, local nationalism often has historical
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14 The liberal and humanitarian oblectives of aid may in fact
be ovrrwhelmed, in the case of donors with malor overseas
interests, by action to support these interests. Thus while
part tif USAID may provide technical assistance to land
reform agencies, another part may be strengthenmg the
politicti forces which oppose any genuine land reform.
roots too deep for any foreign agency to be as
effective as in many countries of Latin America.
And it would be extremely hard to control
really large countries, especially India.'5 There
have been plenty of well-known CIA 'failures'-
notably Cuba, (where they could not manage to
assassinate the Prime Minister, even with the
help of many marvels of modern science),
Eastern Europe and South East Asia and China.
These have to be set against the 'successes'.
Moreover, the CIA is only one of the US de-
partments operating in Latin America. Apart
from State, Defense,'6 Agriculture and Labor are
especially active. Unless one believes in simplistic
conspiracy theses it would be a mistake to assume
that these always toe the CIA line. (However,
under Henry Kissinger CIA-State liaison became
close in Washington, eg over Chile.) There is
also the private sector. In this book the US
multinationals appear as convenient covers for
CIA agents on occasion: they actually, however,
influence the pattern of development in many
other ways, eg by paying out their own bribes
and exerting direct pressure themselves, not
necessarily always in alliance with the agency,
and also by influencing consumption patterns,
choice of techniques, etc.
In any case, while the book may correctly des-
cribe how CIA officials have perceived their role,
we must not confuse this with actuality. The over-
seas branch of any agency is bound to exagger-
ate its effectiveness in reports to its headquarters,
since these are the basis of decisions on personnel
promotion and resource allocation, and eventu-
ally comes to believe much of the hyperbole
itself. Even the CIA's opponents have reason to
overstate its power: this gives them an excuse
when they are defeated, as in Chile, or when they
remain inactiveand helps their propaganda
when they succeed, eg in Cuba. (Analogously the
CIA is bound to exaggerate the power of Com-
munism in order to justify its claims on resources
and its secrecy.)
In fact, the impact of the CIA may be much less
15 One would expect (and the book's material is not incnsistent
with this expectation) a 'small country effect' as in aid-
ie that CIA expenditure per capita of the 'host' population
would tend to be smaller the larger the population.
16 In a lecture at Oxford last June, Orlando Letelisr, former
Defence Minister of Allende, stated that there was mount-
ing evidence that the Defense Intelligence Agency of the
United States (the DIA) participated directly in the planning
and implementation of the coup in Chile. However, a deal
was seemingly struck betwern Kissinger and Senator FrankChurch, head of the Senate Select Committee that in-
vestigated CIA actions in Chile, whereby the Ford govern-
ment would cooperate in providing information about the
activities of the CIA on condition that the investigation
steered dear of the activities of the DIA. Sr. Letelier was
subsequently assassinated in Washingtonthe evidence
suggests that this was done by agents of DINA, the
Chilean intelligence agency.
than the reader might assume. Its information
gathering is extensive, but not necessarily effi-
cient. For a station to select and analyse what is
relevant from the thousands of tape-hours of
monitored conversations must be immensely
difficult. We can also infer from the rather crude
views quotedthough in this respect the author's
reconstructions are somewhat suspectthat CIA
staffs are not nearly sufficiently knowledgeable
about local situations to play politics with great
success. Its personnel are no doubt usually far
less sophisticated than their field agents. Indeed
the latter must often be able to get away with a
mere pretence of activity. They have every reason
not to become too dependent on the agency: over
the years it must have dawned on agents that
CIA policies and thus choice of agents fluctuates
with changes in Washington and replacements of
local agency personnel. Although severance pay
is apparently generous, only a very simple rural
policeman could look on the CIA as the source
of a secure career for a foreigner.
Even more to the point, those on CIA payrolls
must receive money for doing many things they
would do anyway. After all, there were military
coups before the CIA was bornand the police
force of Machado (say) was not exactly com-
posed of gentlemen. The agency can hardly
achieve much unless strong local forces share
the same objectives.17 Only in a complex and
indeterminate situation (such as, perhaps, Chile
in 1973) can its essentially marginal influence be
decisive. Nothing in this book should lead a
reader to infer that national political forces are
analytically irrelevant.
The agency's long-term influence on Latin
American governments is still more doubtful. In
the first place, this would require consistent
secrecy of a sort incompatible with US democratic
institutions. In addition, CIA policy-making
17 There is an interesting analogy here with other trans-
national operations. Fcreign companies, military missions,
technical assistance programmes, etc. cannot operate either
without compliant local ccunterparts.
functions are constrained by overall policy guide-
lines which it has limited power to influence. (it
may in fact be allowed less autonomy under the
Carter administration, at least temporarily,
especially in initiating covert action.)
Moreover, the Latin American regimes now being
supported may well prove incapable of contain-
ing the social pressures which are being generated.
If so, the future influence of the agency (and
thus the US government) will be weakened by
association with political elements, and by the
employment of methods which must appear des-
picable to many of the next generation of Latin
American political leaders (as is already the case
in Greece). This raises the question whether the
national interests of the USA which the agency
is supposed to serve, such as military security,
might not be better promoted, especially in the
longer term, by, for example, switching the
bulk of the more than $1 billion spent on the
agency" to support commodity prices. (It is un-
likely, however, that such crucial cost-benefit
analyses are ever carried out.) An even bigger
question is how serious the long-term effects will
be of undermining the patriotism of many young
Americans.
We cannot really judge precisely how the different
social sciences should handle the informal sector
of diplomacy until we receive more information.
We need more defectors from the CIA and other
agencies in various countries (including Britain),
if only to help us make social science more
relevant! I might perhaps conclude, however, that
two general propositions (for which other support
is not lacking) are confirmed by reading this
book. The first is that purely economic analysis is
virtually useless, especially at the macro level;
the second that in the social sciences quantitative
research is often largely irrelevant.
18 Machetti and Marks op. cit. Chaprr 3. Includes money
which the authors say is spent on the agency's behalf by
Defense, AID, etc. They put the total cost of intelligence
at $6 billion.
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